OpenSSH 7.9 was released on 2018-10-19. It is available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): the setting of the new CASignatureAlgorithms
   option (see below) bans the use of DSA keys as certificate
   authorities.

 * sshd(8): the authentication success/failure log message has
   changed format slightly. It now includes the certificate
   fingerprint (previously it included only key ID and CA key
   fingerprint).

Changes since OpenSSH 7.8
=========================

This is primarily a bugfix release.

New Features
------------

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): allow most port numbers to be specified using
   service names from getservbyname(3) (typically /etc/services).

 * ssh(1): allow the IdentityAgent configuration directive to accept
   environment variable names. This supports the use of multiple
   agent sockets without needing to use fixed paths.

 * sshd(8): support signalling sessions via the SSH protocol.
   A limited subset of signals is supported and only for login or
   command sessions (i.e. not subsystems) that were not subject to
   a forced command via authorized_keys or sshd_config. bz#1424

 * ssh(1): support "ssh -Q sig" to list supported signature options.
   Also "ssh -Q help" to show the full set of supported queries.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a CASignatureAlgorithms option for the
   client and server configs to allow control over which signature
   formats are allowed for CAs to sign certificates. For example,
   this allows banning CAs that sign certificates using the RSA-SHA1
   signature algorithm.

 * sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): allow key revocation lists (KRLs) to
   revoke keys specified by SHA256 hash.

 * ssh-keygen(1): allow creation of key revocation lists directly
   from base64-encoded SHA256 fingerprints. This supports revoking
   keys using only the information contained in sshd(8)
   authentication log messages.

Bugfixes
--------

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): avoid spurious "invalid format" errors when
   attempting to load PEM private keys while using an incorrect
   passphrase. bz#2901

 * sshd(8): when a channel closed message is received from a client,
   close the stderr file descriptor at the same time stdout is
   closed. This avoids stuck processes if they were waiting for
   stderr to close and were insensitive to stdin/out closing. bz#2863

 * ssh(1): allow ForwardX11Timeout=0 to disable the untrusted X11
   forwarding timeout and support X11 forwarding indefinitely.
   Previously the behaviour of ForwardX11Timeout=0 was undefined.

 * sshd(8): when compiled with GSSAPI support, cache supported method
   OIDs regardless of whether GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the
   main section of sshd_config. This avoids sandbox violations if
   GSSAPI authentication was later enabled in a Match block. bz#2107

 * sshd(8): do not fail closed when configured with a text key
   revocation list that contains a too-short key. bz#2897

 * ssh(1): treat connections with ProxyJump specified the same as
   ones with a ProxyCommand set with regards to hostname
   canonicalisation (i.e. don't try to canonicalise the hostname
   unless CanonicalizeHostname is set to 'always'). bz#2896

 * ssh(1): fix regression in OpenSSH 7.8 that could prevent public-
   key authentication using certificates hosted in a ssh-agent(1)
   or against sshd(8) from OpenSSH <7.8.

Portability
-----------

 * All: support building against the openssl-1.1 API (releases 1.1.0g
   and later). The openssl-1.0 API will remain supported at least
   until OpenSSL terminates security patch support for that API version.

 * sshd(8): allow the futex(2) syscall in the Linux seccomp sandbox;
   apparently required by some glibc/OpenSSL combinations.

 * sshd(8): handle getgrouplist(3) returning more than
   _SC_NGROUPS_MAX groups. Some platforms consider this limit more
   as a guideline.

Checksums:
==========

 - SHA1 (openssh-7.9.tar.gz) = 7c50a86b8f591decd172ed7f5527abc533098dec
 - SHA256 (openssh-7.9.tar.gz) = nSVigtHGn3+xKXRqpSnp4YOyEPPAb+pCHdWS9Eh/IPY=

 - SHA1 (openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz) = 993aceedea8ecabb1d0dd7293508a361891c4eaa
 - SHA256 (openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz) = a0s7oiU9hO03ccgFByjVl8kc/OiYcTvre2SjBbbxGq0=

Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not
hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP
key used to sign the releases is available as RELEASE_KEY.asc from
the mirror sites.

Reporting Bugs:
===============

- Please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html
  Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh@openssh.com